Introduction

A Decolonized Empire

On July 4, 1946, in Manila's Luneta Park, a crowd of thousands gathered to witness the end of nearly a half century of U.S. colonial rule in the Philippines. Neither the sudden onset of a tropical rainstorm nor the absence of U.S. president Harry S. Truman—who would relinquish U.S. sovereignty over the "territory and people of the Philippines" from Washington, DC—would dampen the day's ceremonies.[1] Luneta Park was bordered by thoroughfares named for George Dewey, the lionized hero of the Spanish-American War, and William Howard Taft, the first civilian governor of the U.S. colonial state, showing how deeply U.S. colonization had marked Manila's built environment.[2] The event's main stage, however, was placed on a site that, in the nineteenth century, Spanish imperial authorities used to repress its critics.[3] As the U.S. press reported, a flagpole erected where Spanish imperial authorities in 1896 executed Jose Rizal, the "famous martyr of the Philippines fight for freedom," was the focal point of the ceremony.[4] As a U.S. Army band played "The Star-Spangled Banner," Paul V. McNutt, the last U.S. high commissioner, lowered the American flag while Philippine president Manuel Roxas raised the red, white, blue, and yellow flag of the Philippines over the Rizal monument.

The monument to Rizal had been constructed in 1908–1913 by a U.S. colonial state eager to cast the "national hero" in a starring role in the Philippines' developing nationalism, a process that would reach its end point thanks to U.S. benevolence.[5] That U.S. colonization stood as an aberration in a Western colonial pattern otherwise marked by exploitation, subjugation, and oppression—as General Douglas MacArthur intoned in his Independence Day address—was reiterated by Roxas, who, in his own speech, claimed that U.S. colonization was "so nobly and unselfishly accomplished" that it had successfully turned the Philippines into the "staging area for democracy in this part of the world."[6] During the July 4 celebration, Americans and Filipinos projected an image of independence they wanted the world to see, created by the anti-imperial, global power of the United States.

The layers of colonial history on display at the Philippine Independence Day celebration were not simply about how the colonial past would be remembered in the Philippines or in the United States. Indeed, during Truman's recorded address—broadcast in the Philippines as well as in twenty-five other countries around the globe—the U.S. president claimed that the United States' "great experiment in Pacific democracy" had "chartered a pattern of relationships for all the world to study."[7] Philippine independence *was* historically significant, especially for Filipinos, who had lived for centuries under two imperial powers. But even as it shed its largest territorial possession in the Pacific, the United States was extending its power across the globe. And the U.S.-Philippine "pattern of relationships" was key to this extension of global power. The investment of U.S. policymakers, and Filipino elites such as Roxas, in defining and controlling the meaning of Philippine independence—and the relationship between the United States and the Philippines—reveals the

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entanglement of Philippine colonial history with the expansion of U.S. global power in the context of emerging Cold War global politics and the era of decolonization.[8]

Freedom Incorporated argues that the Philippines was the lynchpin in the construction of a decolonized U.S. empire and that anticommunist ideologies and political projects were critical pieces in the United States' effort to expand imperial power in the age of decolonization. As a history of U.S. imperialism and anticommunism, this book details how, in the Philippines, the two became intertwined with U.S. political ideas about the colonial order and the place of the United States in it. Tracing the development and deployment of two specific operations of anticommunism—maintaining an ideology of imperial exceptionalism and repressing political dissent—this book details how Filipinos and their U.S. allies transformed local political struggles into sites of global communist revolution and international warfare. By linking political struggles over local resources and power in the Philippines to a global war against communism, U.S. and Filipino anticommunists legitimized the use of violence as a means to capture and contain the alternative forms of political, economic, and social organization as imagined by a diverse range of nonelite political actors. Both U.S. policymakers and Filipino elites promoted the Philippines as a testament to the United States' benevolent policies toward colonialism and colonized people, and therefore it was a critical site for politicians of the two nations to demonstrate the successes of their ideological beliefs. Global anticommunism in the Philippines thus worked to affirm the processes of global decolonization while simultaneously containing challenges to colonial rule.

Because enemies of the Philippine Left used anticommunism as a way to discredit and marginalize challenges to elite rule, Filipino elites and their U.S. allies made U.S. imperial exceptionalism and anticommunist politics—two ideological formations that took shape in the colonial period—defining features of the postcolonial relationship between the two nations. From the early 1930s to the late 1950s, U.S. policymakers, state agents, and Filipino elites used anticommunist policies to quash leftist opposition locally and internationally and to explain how U.S. intervention could exist alongside Philippine independence. Inverting Vladimir Lenin's linking of self-determination to anticolonialism, U.S. policymakers and Filipino elites insisted that an imperialistic, global communism threatened Philippine sovereignty, while the United States and its political allies in the Philippines stood for freedom and independence. *Freedom Incorporated* suggests that Americans and Filipinos used anticommunist politics to drive a stake through the radical anticolonial ideologies that located imperialism, capitalism, and racism as distinct projects of the West, including the United States.[9] Furthermore, this book argues that understanding how the extension of U.S. power in the age of decolonization took shape requires returning to the colonial period in the Philippines, where, beginning in the late 1920s, anticommunist politics intersected with a U.S. discourse of imperial exceptionalism that depended on the Philippines' role as a modern, model, postcolonial democracy on the global stage.

In placing the history of anticommunism in the Philippines within an imperial framework, this book reveals the function of anticommunist politics beyond just curtailing the popularity of communism in the nation or cultivating a particular kind of anticolonial nationalism, although anticommunist politics certainly aimed to achieve both goals. *Freedom Incorporated* traces a motley assemblage of U.S. and Filipino intelligence agents, military officials, paramilitaries, state bureaucrats, academics, and entrepreneurs who advanced U.S. imperial power by mobilizing anticommunist politics that disarticulated the United States from histories of empire, imperialism, and the colonial racial order.[10] For U.S. policymakers, who, as one scholar recently noted, were more focused on the decline of Western colonialism and its "inseparable" features of racialism, white supremacy, and underdevelopment than on the Cold War conflict between superpowers, the U.S. relationship to the Philippines was an overture to decolonizing countries.[11]

The Cold War and decolonization are undoubtedly interrelated temporally, and numerous studies of their intersection have complicated understandings of the Cold War and twentieth-century international history. However, the U.S. role in decolonization foregrounds Cold War geopolitics and, as a result, overlooks the history of U.S. empire in the Philippines.[12]

In 1947, the term "Cold War" came into common use,[13] and soon a second word, "containment," revealed the spatial framework of U.S. global power.[14] Yet Truman and his national security team quickly identified containment's limits.

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In 1948, deciding that containing Communists' territorial "conquests" was not enough, the newly created U.S. National Security Council (NSC) argued that defense of the "Free World" necessitated a set of policies and actions that would "reduce the power and influence of the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] to limits which no longer constitute a threat to peace."[15] In diplomatic history, Truman's decisions to provide aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947, the creation in 1949 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), and the massive mobilization of military aid called for by the NCS in its 1950 report "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" (known as NSC-68) characterize Americans' ratcheting up of the conflict with the Soviets, the mission having changed from containment to rollback, and defense spending and military aid soared as U.S. policymakers decided to "arm the free world."[16] This most familiar guise of Cold War anticommunism—singularly shaped by the sense of a world split in two, in which global politics revolved around two centers of gravity—has been central to studies of U.S. Cold War interventions in decolonizing countries. In this conventional narrative, it is easy to interpret anticommunism as an unchanging and ready-made answer to any U.S. Cold War question. To be sure, the United States' ideological battle with the Soviet Union was significant. Yet, as Prasenjit Duara has argued, understanding how the Cold War intersected with decolonization requires tracing a longer history of imperial relationships.[17]

Indeed, two polices that historians identify as the primary vehicles for the extension of anticommunist U.S. global power in the postwar era—aiding anticommunist forces in Greece and Turkey in 1947 and the burst of military spending and the fortification of U.S. military bases around the world that resulted from the acceptance of NSC-68 in 1950—had precursors in the Philippines. In fact, the first postwar U.S. military aid program was created for the Philippines in 1946. Shortly before the July 4, 1946, ceremony that marked the transfer of sovereignty from the United States to the independent Philippine Republic, Truman approved the Philippine Military Assistance Act, which provided for the transfer of $100 million worth of wartime munitions to the Philippine Republic and authorized the U.S. military to train the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on terms "consistent with military and naval requirements of the United States and with the national interest."[18] U.S. policymakers transferred $100 million worth of military goods to the newly independent republic for two interconnected reasons: one, to ensure the permanent presence of the U.S. military on the islands and, two, to repress growing protests against the return of the colonial status quo in the Philippines. Intended to ensure "the preservation of internal order" in the Philippines, the 1946 Military Assistance Act was Washington weighing the political scales toward the Philippine political elite and their efforts to restore the prewar order.[19]

A year after the Military Assistance Act, the 1947 Military Bases Agreement gave the United States ninety-nine-year leases on twenty-three military installations carving into the sovereign Philippine territory. In a hearing on the bill, Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman argued that the Philippines was a "keystone in the foundation of a base system essential to the security of the United States." The Philippine Military Assistance Act and the Military Bases Agreement clearly demonstrated that, despite U.S. claims otherwise, not only would the United States continue to assert its will over the islands' internal political struggles, but the islands would serve as a key site for the exertion of U.S. military power in Asia and the Pacific.[20]

The Philippines is not simply a case study for understanding the postwar expansion of U.S. global power, nor is this book a corrective to "top-down" histories that obscure the agency of non-Western individuals.[21] Instead, focusing on the Philippines uncovers how anticommunist Filipinos, who believed that the postcolonial world would be marked by the interdependence of nations, sought to enact national policies to draw the island country closer to its former colonizer. Filipino elites, who had amassed both political and economic power in the colonial Philippines, imagined themselves to be part of an emerging postcolonial leadership and, in order to maintain their hold on power, fought to keep the colonial order intact in the independent Philippine Republic. They played important roles in constructing and promoting the sense that U.S. global power and the global war against communism were inherently anti-imperialist. Understanding how

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Filipino elites played key roles in constructing the space of global warfare makes for a sharper analysis of new racial formations—many of which cut across national lines and blurred older definitions of colonizer and colonized—as integral to the construction and maintenance of twentieth-century U.S. global power.[22]

U.S. Imperial Exceptionalism

In 1906, George A. Malcolm, a twenty-five-year-old from a small town, graduated with a law degree from the University of Michigan and set out with "determination to become a fledgling colonial officer in the faraway Philippines."[23] Initially, Malcolm worked in the Bureau of Health and the Bureau of Justice; in 1912, he helped establish and then became dean of the College of Law at the University of the Philippines, where the main office building in Manila still bears his name. In addition to serving in the colonial state and at the university, Malcolm authored a 763-page tome titled *The Government of the Philippine Islands*, published in 1916, and also textbooks on Philippine civics and constitutional law.[24] An appointee of Woodrow Wilson to the Philippine Supreme Court in 1917, Malcolm remained on the bench until the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, at which point he took a position as legal adviser to the U.S. high commissioner, the top U.S.-held position on the islands. From 1939 to 1943, Malcolm served as attorney general of Puerto Rico, another U.S. imperial site, but six years later he returned to teach legal and judicial ethics at the University of the Philippines.[25]

Malcolm practiced what he considered to be efficient ways for managing "dependent peoples" in the Philippines, and from these experiences he extrapolated theories to apply to the broader colonial world. As both a scholar and a statesman, he was part of a cadre of men who translated their experiences in colonial administration into new realms of academic pursuit. Culling data from colonial sites, scholars from varied disciplinary backgrounds—from historians and economists to political scientists and ethnologists—cataloged peoples, environments, and terrains all in the name of improving colonial administration.[26] As is well documented, the expansion and consolidation of global empires in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries depended on this production of knowledge as a mode of imperial power. The classification of colonial subjects into, for example, racial or tribal categories served both as the organizing principles for the daily ins and outs of colonial administration and as the building blocks for hierarchies of difference legitimating Anglo-European claims to civilizational superiority. On the global terrain of imperial cooperation and competition, colonial administration legitimated the rule of colonizer over colonized *and* the efforts of the "architects and agents of empire" to declare the superiority of one imperial nation over another.[27] During his thirty-year career in the Philippines, Malcolm—like others in the U.S. colonial service—was guided by William McKinley's belief that Americans' purpose was "not to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government."[28] Malcolm's reflections on his own career in the Philippines and Puerto Rico, and his belief that his service demonstrated a resolute "adherence to America's revolutionary anti-colonial policy," demonstrate the pervasiveness and purpose of U.S. imperial exceptionalism.[29]

Freedom Incorporated draws on the work of scholars who propose imperial exceptionalism as a fundamental feature in the exercise of imperial power. Claiming exceptionalism—to be different, to be exceptional—was a shared feature of imperial politics, and exceptionalist ideologies were, as Paul A. Kramer has argued, "produced on imperial terrain."[30] Like the hierarchies of difference that organized and justified imperial rule, exceptionalist ideologies functioned as a mode of imperial power. Exceptionalist ideologies could also, importantly, serve to legitimate one empire's form of rule over another's. Illustrating just how "unexceptional" U.S. imperial policy was in the Philippines helps to explain

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why—even as the United States moved toward granting the Philippines independence during the 1930s—Americans continued to portray and even understand the United States' version of imperialism as inherently different from that of its European counterparts, as anti-imperial even. In an examination of the transformation in the U.S.-Philippine relationship from the early 1930s to the late 1950s, the discursive and structural components of U.S. imperial power come into view in concrete ways. The point here is not to draw out the historic differences between the United States and other imperial powers in Southeast Asia; rather, it is to analyze and elucidate how claims of U.S. imperial exceptionalism changed as the Philippines transitioned from colony to independent republic *and* as anticolonial movements gained steam through the early Cold War period.

Despite the title of Malcolm's 1957 memoir—*American Colonial Careerist*—and a belief that Americans and Britons shared an Anglo-Saxon culture that uniquely suited them to imperialism's civilizing mission, Malcolm did not believe that the United States was part of the imperial world order. His 1906 arrival in the Philippines occurred, as he described it, "at the heyday of Imperialism when European powers ruled colonies covering half the globe." The colonization of the Philippines was decidedly *not* a part of this history.[31] To Malcolm, U.S. control of the Philippines was a relationship of support rather than one of imperial domination, one that was instructive, not oppressive.[32] Despite the destructive racial and civilizational hierarchies that underpinned these rationalizations, and that enabled Malcolm to forge a career in "the American equivalent" to what other empires "called the 'Colonial Service,' " Malcolm believed the United States was an empire only in that it was guided by the noble aspirations of "liberty and justice for all."[33] In *American Colonial Careerist*, written in the midst of the Cold War and wars of decolonization, Malcolm offered a version of colonial history that dovetailed with the views of U.S. foreign policymakers in the Philippines: that U.S. colonial tutelage had successfully produced a shining example of colonial rule and a model of peaceful decolonization in Southeast Asia.

However, ideologies of U.S. imperial exceptionalism produced and disseminated by the "architects and agents of empire" did not go unchallenged.[34] Following World War I (WWI), Leninist and Wilsonian ideas about nationalism, imperialism, and self-determination galvanized anticolonial movements.[35] Marxist- and Leninist-inspired anticolonial movements, in particular, forced U.S. policymakers to grapple with what the conquest of the Philippines meant for the United States' place in the colonial racial order, as well as in the global imperial one. Americans' own racialized and classed conceptions of Filipinos' perceived lack of political capacity seemed to legitimate colonial rule, but exempting the United States from colonialism's "global color line" was a difficult feat. Despite long-standing exceptionalist beliefs shared by U.S. colonial officials such as Malcolm, a radical anti-imperial movement—one that countered notions that the United States acted as an anti-imperial force for good in the world—*did* emerge in the Philippines. In fact, in his position on the Supreme Court, Malcolm confronted the challenge of Philippine radical anticolonialism when, in 1932, he ruled to outlaw the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), or Philippine Communist Party.[36] As global imperial policies shifted from increased self-governance and "colonial development" projects in the interwar period to outright wars for independence in the postwar era, U.S. imperial formations adapted as well. Following World War II (WWII), the contradiction between the rhetoric of U.S. exceptionalism—the idea that the United States was an inherently anti-imperial nation—and reality sharpened as the United States expanded its military and political influence globally and sided with European empires in the face of anticolonial conflicts.

As a history of U.S. imperialism in transition, this book is a story of asymmetrical power. This imperial relationship shapes the archive; reflecting on the relationship across power, archives, and the writing of imperial histories, anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler observes, "Transparency is not what archival collections are known for."[37] This is particularly true when it comes to topics that fall under the broad rubric of "national security issues," as the concerns in this book overwhelmingly do.[38] That said, U.S. government records remain the disproportionate source of material for this study, a reflection itself of the uneven power between the two nations. And though documents collected by U.S.

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authorities, particularly during the wartime and immediate postwar years, provide an entry into the perspectives and motivations of well-known groups—for example, the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Peoples' Army against the Japanese), known as the Hukbalahaps, or Huks—gaining access to the Philippine side of this story has been a consistent challenge.[39] The structural imbalance between the United States and the Philippines also shaped the terrain of possibilities on which Filipino elites could maneuver; yet, despite the unevenness, U.S. policymakers' commitment to the strategic and symbolic significance of the Philippines created an environment in which Filipinos could exert more agency than might be expected. In *Freedom Incorporated*, elite Filipinos play an important role: driving the anticommunist campaign against the Huks, leveraging the symbolic and strategic role of the Philippines to gain disbursements of U.S. military and development aid, and testifying on the global stage that the United States had "inaugurated" decolonization by "setting the Philippines free."[40] Thus the voices and actions of elite Filipinos are crucial to this history despite the overwhelming power possessed by the United States vis-à-vis the islands.

Empire and Anticommunism

Throughout the twentieth century, U.S. actors including politicians continually espoused exceptional ideas and, in doing so, contributed to the erasure of U.S. imperial history. Primary sources that continue to inform historical work are littered with examples of imperial exceptionalism, although these are seldom detected. Relying on materials of high-profile anticommunist events in the United States, such as the 1930 U.S. House of Representatives Special Committee to Investigate Communist Activities in the United States hearings, also known as the Fish Committee hearings, has likely led many historians of U.S. anticommunism to conclude that U.S. politicians cared little about anticommunism in the U.S. colony. Yet, analyzing the proceedings of the Fish Committee in the context of U.S. exceptionalism and imperial history helps show that anticommunist politics worked in tandem with the notion that the United States was an exceptional colonial power. By neglecting to connect U.S. colonial history in the Philippines with a wider history of anticommunism in the colonial world, and therefore ignoring the ways imperialism has shaped U.S. culture and politics—including the way that U.S. political leaders thought about colonialism and the Philippines—historians, intentionally or not, have reinforced the ideology of U.S. imperial exceptionalism.[41] Moreover, attending to both interwar and postwar U.S. imperial history helps lend nuance to understandings of U.S. anticommunism that have focused primarily on the development of domestic laws, networks, and institutions.[42]

Historians' endeavors to highlight continuity across pre-and post-WWII antisubversive politics by uncovering state-level anticommunist policies have tended to connect the first Red Scare of 1917–1920 to the Cold War; because of that, they have reconstructed the networks of local anticommunist political actors and institutions in the 1920s and 1930s that fueled broader Cold War anticommunist politics. But even this work has all too often ignored U.S. imperial history and viewed anticommunism as a response to local conditions rather than as a facet of the politics of U.S. imperial power.[43]

Moreover, despite the recent growth in literature on the colonial Philippines, histories of U.S. imperialism and U.S. anticommunism have continued to flow in relatively separate historiographical streams. Though historians of the Cold War have begun to bridge the two, few scholars examine the connections between U.S. anticommunism and U.S. rule in the colonial Philippines, viewing the first as a domestic project and the second in terms of foreign policy. This separation is particularly striking in light of historians' increased interest in transnational history.[44]

This problem is not simply the product of historians choosing to focus solely on histories within the continental United States.[45] Although historians have emphasized the ways that anticommunism did not simply equate to an anti-Soviet position but instead encompassed a much broader range of political positions, the divide between the

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"foreign" and the "domestic" has remained firmly entrenched in the literature on interwar U.S. anticommunism. Although a rich body of scholarship has revealed the breadth and diversity of anticommunist politics—emphasizing the flexibility of this discourse that, as historian Landon R. Y. Storrs has argued, historical actors employed "at various places and moments in defense of class, religious, and racial hierarchies"—it has nonetheless also overlooked the imperial dimensions of U.S. society.[47] As a result, the ways that imperial encounters have shaped historical actors' sense of social relations—ranging from race and gender to labor and conceptions of civilizations—remain unexamined. Moreover, while historians of the Cold War have emphasized the importance of anticolonial rhetoric in the United States' ideological battle with the Soviet Union, less attention has been paid to how central the colonial relationship to the Philippines was for U.S. policymakers who sought to win the favor of anticolonial nationalists in Southeast Asia.

The role of the United States, usually considered a "latecomer" to the imperial game and frequently characterized as an aberrant empire that ceded territorial control for economic hegemony, is often refracted through the lens of the Cold War, thus obscuring its imperial history of the pre- and postwar eras. This is not to suggest that U.S. imperialism *was not* different from European variants; however, as numerous comparative studies of European imperialism have detailed, imperial power and colonial rule qualitatively differed *between* imperial powers and even *across* imperial sites of the same empire. Like other colonial powers in the region, the U.S. colonial state in the Philippines repressed communism as well as other radical labor and anticolonial movements through increased policing, mass imprisonment, and the criminalization of party-based communist politics.

As home to many U.S. military installations, the Philippines was a strategically critical site for expanding and maintaining U.S. power in Asia, and thus geopolitical considerations explain one reason why U.S. policymakers committed this military assistance. But U.S. policymakers also made these decisions because they believed in the symbolic import of the model colony to shape, positively or negatively, the U.S. relationship to the "Afro-Asian bloc" during the Cold War. Both U.S. and Filipino anticommunists believed in the centrality of the Philippines in the fight against communism; as the first president of the independent republic, Manuel Roxas, put it, the Philippines was the "staging area for democracy" in the Far East, the model of enlightened colonial and postcolonial policy.[48] And, in the context of the Cold War and decolonization, U.S. and Filipino elites' exceptionalist commitment to conceiving the Philippines as a model colony enabled the use of violence against Philippine civilians in the name of anticommunism.

To be sure, both U.S. and Philippine politicians *believed* that communism posed a threat to the way of life in their respective countries. Moreover, although anticommunists tended to view discrete and disparate progressive and reform movements as "communistic," there also *were* self-described communist individuals and groups in the Philippines who truly believed that the USSR represented the best example of a just society and welcomed Soviet assistance. But during the 1930s and the immediate post-WWII years, those who identified as communist or Marxist tended to focus on organizing for social reforms, such as giving "tenants an equitable share in the harvest"; indeed, the vast majority of individual Communists advocated for reforming the political system, not overthrowing it.[49] However, as a tactic in their larger fight against communism, Filipino and U.S. anticommunists branded dissent as subversion, repressed alternative visions for the postindependence Philippine political and economic order, and strengthened the elite political class's political hold.[50] Furthermore, by wedding anticommunist politics and violence to concepts of economic security and freedom, anticommunists worked to consolidate a particular definition of political independence in the Philippines, one that was divorced from economic equality either among nations *or* within nations and that Washington policymakers and their anticommunist allies would go on to use throughout the Cold War.

Because most histories of U.S. engagement with global decolonization efforts proffer a teleological narrative of sovereignty and independence that invariably begins after WWII—a periodization that also aligns with Philippine independence—accounts of the United States' role in decolonization usually ignore U.S. empire in Southeast Asia. As a consequence, continuities between U.S. imperial power across the traditional pre- and post-1945 division fall from view. This is not to say that anticommunist politics crafted in the colonial period were deployed unchanged after 1945 or that the roots of anticommunist U.S. foreign policy lay solely in the Philippines. Instead, it is to say that colonization and decolonization in the Philippines—including the development and deployment of anticommunist politics—shaped U.S. responses to decolonization more broadly. The intention of this book is not to emphasize colonial-postcolonial

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continuities, but rather to illuminate the legacies and adaptations of U.S. imperial power—by tracing anticommunist politics—during moments of profound local, regional, and global transitions.[51]

Freedom Incorporated

In June 1953, Edward Lansdale of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) boarded a plane at Clark Air Force Base, the sprawling, 130,000-acre U.S. military installation located just north of Manila. Three years before, agent Lansdale had traveled to the Philippines to advise Ramón Magsaysay, the Philippine secretary of national defense and head of the nation's armed forces, on issues of internal security. From 1950 to 1953, Lansdale, flush with U.S. funding, helped the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in its war to eradicate the Huks. Formed in 1942, after the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines, and largely made up of peasant union members, the Huks spent the years of WWII believing they were part of a global struggle against fascism. Citing a "profound faith in the four freedoms proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter," the Huks believed their wartime contributions would enable them "to bargain for better living conditions for the peasants and laborers" at the end of the war.[52] Instead, Americans and Filipinos, both eager to restore the prewar social and political order in advance of Philippine independence, cast the Huks as communist revolutionaries who plotted to overthrow the Philippine state. By 1953, however, as Lansdale was leaving the islands, the nearly seven-year-long campaign against the Huks was finally coming to an end. The campaign was celebrated in the U.S. press as "the first victory over Asian communism," and U.S. and Filipino policymakers—including Lansdale—believed that they had created a universally applicable model for successful anticommunist warfare. When Lansdale got off the plane, he was in Saigon. And within a year, he would bring the "Freedom Company," a CIA-funded Filipino paramilitary organization, and with it the strategy of the Huk campaign—"all-out friendship or all-out force"—to the war of decolonization in Vietnam.[53]

Ten years later, in the summer of 1964, before the United States sent its first ground troops into Vietnam, Lansdale reiterated the importance of the Philippine campaign in a CIA working paper, "Concept for Victory in Vietnam." In Lansdale's victory plan, the United States would send to Vietnam a "Free World Action arm" made up of "men who have proven their ability to defeat Asian Communist subversive insurgents." This "small team of winners" would include "a U.S. counterinsurgency leader" and volunteers from the United States and from "the Philippines, Nationalist China, and Thailand." The team would have the full backing of Washington but would enjoy "great freedom of action" in the field.[54] In fact, Lansdale had already floated the idea in 1958, extolling the added benefit of using "foreign manpower" or "volunteers to satisfy national objectives in foreign areas" as a means to cloak the hand of the United States.[55] To allow for maximum legal deniability, Lansdale proposed establishing a corporation, the "international Freedom Company," modeled on the Freedom Company in the Philippines. The "international Freedom Company"—or, as he put it in 1958, "Freedom Incorporated"—would function as "a public corporation pledged to the cause of man's liberty."[56] The enterprise, he believed, would attract freedom-loving volunteers "from Cambodia, Laos, and even North Vietnam" who wanted an opportunity "to join the good fight … before it [was] altogether too late."[57] In the fight to secure victory for the "Free World"—and to ensure his desired "Pax Americana" across the globe—Lansdale was convinced that "the conventional is not enough."[58] In fact, the *un*conventional had become, for Lansdale, indispensable to successful war making in Southeast Asia. Agent Lansdale's plan to arm international companies of men who simply "love liberty and want to join the good fight," underscores how the counterrevolutionary violence—or "great freedom of action"—endorsed by Washington had become a convention of "Pax Americana."[59]

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Anticommunism was both the drive and the legitimating doctrine for the type of warfare Lansdale promoted. And while he clearly connected the worldwide spread of anticommunist politics to the maintenance of U.S. global power, the incorporation of non-U.S. actors into the imperial sphere of the United States was critical to Lansdale's vision. The extension of foreign-led paramilitary organizations based on the Freedom Company model was only "logical"; to Lansdale, it made perfect sense to have those who had already succeeded in "countering Communist subversive insurgency" enlisted to "help people throw off Communist tyranny" in other areas. Like corporate franchisors entering new markets, teams from each new Freedom Company would "enter the country as advisors and technicians to help free the country."[60] Helmed by a "U.S. board of directors selected from distinguished Americans thoroughly familiar with top police needs," however, the global network of anticommunist subsidiaries comprising "Freedom Incorporated" would be wholly controlled by the United States.[61] In Lansdale's Freedom Incorporated, the corporate body Freedom—the United States, which traditionally views itself as a symbol of freedom—would oversee its composite members, "incorporated" companies in the freedom-loving client states of the world. Figuratively, therefore, the name Freedom Incorporated reveals the management structure and components of a U.S. empire called Freedom, an empire that was—according to its fundamental charter—not one.

Lansdale's career as an expert in counterinsurgency skyrocketed because some of the highest-ranking U.S. policymakers—including Dwight Eisenhower and CIA director Allen Dulles—praised his work in the Huk campaign and the 1953 election of Ramón Magsaysay to the Philippine presidency.[62] Lansdale was certainly one of the more colorful characters in the history of postwar U.S. foreign policy, and his influence on counterinsurgency warfare, a recent biography claimed, "was rivaled only by that of T. E. Lawrence."[63] This is surely debatable, and Lansdale's career will, no doubt, continue to be scrutinized and debated by historians. Yet the comparison between the two is useful for highlighting the presence, in Lawrence's case, and absence, in Lansdale's, of an imperial context.[64] While British imperialism inevitably factors into histories of Lawrence, the erasure of U.S. imperialism is a notable feature in histories of Lansdale.[65] In fact, Lansdale's career in the Philippines and his efforts to transfer the knowledge of "unconventional warfare" he learned on the islands to operations in Vietnam, Laos, the Caribbean, and Latin America unfolded in the context of, and contributed to, shifts in U.S. imperial power.[66]

It is not coincidental that Lansdale's vision to create "Pax Americana in the world" through anticommunist warfare emerged in the Philippines, because anticommunist politics became a crucial part of a U.S. effort to project the Philippines as a model of postcolonial statehood.[67] Anticommunists in the Philippines also believed the islands could serve as a laboratory for exportable models of decolonization as well as anticommunist warfare. After WWII, the U.S. imperial project shifted, and, as Washington learned, Filipino anticommunists were already contributing to forging anticommunism's global frame in the Philippines. Indeed, by 1946, Philippine political elites had already branded the Huks as a communist threat. Americans were not as convinced. For example, in the hearing that led to the passage of the Philippine Military Assistance Act in 1946, General W. H. Arnold, a deputy assistant in the Operations Division of the U.S. War Department, was asked about the "guerrilla threat" in the Philippines and whether he believed that the Huks actually posed a revolutionary danger warranting so many million dollars' worth of U.S. military aid. In response, the general demurred and requested to provide his answer off the record.[68] Nonetheless, in the end the Military Assistance Act passed, marking the seed money for what would become a multiyear campaign to ensure the "internal order" of the Philippines.

Huklandia and Anticommunist Geography

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In most accounts of the "global Cold War," the geographic scale of the "global" is assumed to be the way in which humans understand, describe, and organize their worlds. The "global" was not a new, mid-twentieth-century creation, nor did the global war against communism emerge solely from the Philippines. In this study, the "global" is not an all-encompassing synonym for the world or a space where history "took place."[69] Following the lead of Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, who argue that a critical element of late nineteenth-century imperialism—and one that wove through economic, political, and cultural threads—was a spatial logic based on the sense that geopolitics were governed by an imperial world order, this book pays attention to the functioning of spatial definitions, such as the "global," as modes of power.[70] While the Philippines was certainly an important part of *global* anticommunism, it was also just one part of a broader global movement that, despite deep tensions and points of friction, gained meaning and constituted power through the spatial logic of global warfare.[71]

This book is not a history of anticommunism around the world. Instead, *Freedom Incorporated* analyzes global anticommunism as a process and a discourse, in Ballantyne and Burton's terms, a "spatial idiom of imperial power."[72] In this analysis, examining the "spatial idiom" means attending to the ways that anticommunists determined the geographic scale of events and turned "local" struggles into fronts in a "global" war. For example, in August 1946, the *Field Artillery Journal*—a monthly publication read by U.S. Army and Marine Field Artillery soldiers stationed around the world—published a piece about an ongoing war between the newly independent Philippine Republic and the WWII Philippine guerrilla army, the Hukbalahaps. In the article, author Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, a veteran of the First World War, warned that the "civilizing effects of contact with the white races" threated to be undone by the violent and "practically communist" Huks. Lanza's description of the Huks' takeover of the "governments of three provinces—Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija" recalled the same racial logic that had originally justified the U.S. colonial state in the Philippines. Repeating a sensationalist yet unconfirmed rumor that the Huks "had flayed alive prisoners" and "roasted them while living over a fire," Lanza's depiction of the Huks as lawless, brutal, and recalcitrant made it clear to his readers that they placed the United States' "civilizing mission" in the Philippines in jeopardy. Americans were not the only ones who believed in the "civilizing effects" that Lanza referenced in his piece. Like Lanza, a class of Philippine political elites who had been brought into the colonial state by U.S. officials also believed that the "civilizing effects" of U.S. colonial rule had succeeded in transforming some Filipinos into modern political subjects. It was this group of "civilized Filipinos" whom, according to Lanza, the "communistic Huks" sought to unseat. Lanza warned his readers that the Huks had already been so successful that the Central Luzon provinces of Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Bulacan, and Tarlac were "now commonly referred to as "Huklandia."[73] Lanza's 1946 account of the war with the Huks conveyed his assumption that the U.S. colonial project—or, as he phrased it, "the civilizing effects of the white races"—had been a success and was now, only one month after Philippine independence, threatened by communist agitation. Even though it was not an official territory, by the time Lanza wrote his article in August 1946, "Huklandia" had indeed already begun to appear on military maps and in the archipelago's major English daily newspapers. And, from 1946 to 1954, Huklandia would be the place where the AFP, with the assistance of U.S. military advisers, would wage a brutal counterinsurgency war. In only a short span of time, Huklandia had become a place. More importantly, it became *the place* where "Free World" scored "its first victory over Asian communism."[74]

Overview of Chapters

The story of global anticommunism begins in the colonial Philippines in the 1920s. Chapter 1 examines how anticommunist politics emerged alongside international socialist and communist anti-imperial movements during the late 1920s and early 1930s, when U.S. and Philippine political and military officials turned to anticommunism politics to explain the rise of labor and peasant protest, proscribe class-based anti-imperial critiques, and bolster the nationalism of the governing Filipino political elites. Indeed, even before the official formation of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) in 1930, U.S. and Philippine officials deployed "anti-red" politics to limit the acceptable range of political debate

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[75]

and protest in the archipelago. Throughout the 1930s, U.S. and Filipino policymakers attempted to eliminate socialist, communist, and peasant labor activists' ideas from the political sphere through state repression. Yet by 1939, with the rise of fascism in Europe and Japan and the subsequent embrace of the "popular front" by Western communist parties, Franklin D. Roosevelt pressured the Philippine Commonwealth to minimize its persecution of the political Left. Focusing on the economic, political, and social structures of the colonial state that gave rise to anticolonial critiques and movements, chapter 1 shows how a transnational political class of Americans and Filipinos anticipated independence by tightening their hold on social, economic, and political power within the islands.

The Japanese invasion of the Philippines, mere hours after the attack on the U.S. military installations at Pearl Harbor, left the islands exposed to the brutal collision between warring imperial powers. By early May 1942, Japanese forces quickly overwhelmed the unsupported U.S. Army in the Philippines, and the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 loosened the grip that political elites had maintained in the rural areas. This marked a shift for the Philippine Communist Party and peasant activists, who allied with the United States and some Filipino elite to overthrow the Japanese imperial forces. After WWII, however, state policy toward these dissident groups shifted again. Chapter 2 describes how, after the war and the reinstatement of elite control, the Filipino guerrillas who allied with the United States during WWII were cast as threats to national order.

After the war, peasant uprisings in Central Luzon, labor strikes on U.S. military bases in the islands, and the appeal of the Philippine Communist Party—grounded in concrete political demands such as higher wages, adequate housing, and the ability to attain credit to buy farming tools—threatened to dissolve U.S. policymakers' efforts to promote Philippine independence as a testament to the benevolence and anti-imperial impulses of U.S. foreign aid and policies. In opposition, a multiyear counterinsurgency campaign brought millions of dollars of U.S. military aid into the country, resulting in the increased militarization of Philippine society as well as the near total defeat of peasant and working-class alternatives to Philippine elite control of the state. But while Filipino politicians such as Carlos P. Romulo—who served as president of the United Nations General Assembly—affirmed decolonization in Southeast Asia, they also faced the challenge of explaining how Philippine independence could effectively coincide with the substantial U.S. political, economic, and military intervention needed to quell the violence in Central Luzon. Despite U.S. and Philippine pronouncements that the nation represented a "showcase of democracy," the bloodletting in Central Luzon would eventually attract the attention of the international press, which also called into question the stability and legitimacy of the newly independent Philippine Republic. In response, Americans and Filipinos effectively collaborated to reinterpret peasant complaints against the state through the lens of a global war against communism. Thus chapter 3 outlines how, by the late 1940s, the Philippine state—with the support of U.S. military dollars, equipment, and advisers—launched a war against its own citizens in the name of global anticommunism.

The violence in the countryside was not the only challenge faced by Philippine political elites during the first fifteen years of independence. Despite the almost complete repression of the Huk movement in the early 1950s, the Philippines continued to flounder economically, and this threatened the U.S. and Philippine elites' promotion of the Philippines as a model of postindependence statehood. As early as 1953, U.S. technocrats in the Philippines raised alarms over the counterinsurgency war, state bankruptcy, a stagnating economy, and elections marred by endemic violence and intimidation. It seemed that the U.S. model for decolonization and postcolonial statehood in the Philippines did not, in fact, look much different from the rest of Southeast Asia. Chapter 4 analyzes the United States' technocratic response to the crisis: how the United States sent "technical" experts to the Philippines to reform corruption, create a Philippine middle class, and jump-start the economy. For as Lansdale inquired, "How can Communists ask people [to] overthrow [76] [a] gov[ernmen]t which they feel belongs to them?" Turning toward considerations of economic development and technical aid, chapter 4 illustrates technocratic attempts to enact local or national reforms that collapsed under the weight of global anticommunist imperatives demanding that U.S. policymakers continue to cultivate relationships with the same elite class identified as the source of the Philippine government's problems.

Chapter 5 examines the formation of a private paramilitary organization in the 1950s by CIA agents who were associated with Lansdale, as well as by a group of veterans from the AFP. This "Freedom Company" was meant to transport the "lessons of the Huk campaign" to sites elsewhere in Asia and Latin America. As an organizing principle, the Freedom Company and its U.S.-based supporters assumed that U.S. colonialism had imparted "modern political knowledge" to Filipinos; as the most "politically modern" Asians, therefore, they were best equipped to "export democracy" throughout the region. The Freedom Company Philippines (FCP), staffed entirely by Filipinos in an effort to distance contemporary U.S. interventions from a history of Western imperialism, actively promoted the idea that the U.S. colonial project in the Philippines had succeeded, while European imperial practices had failed to develop Asian societies

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properly. Though steeped in racialized perceptions regarding the political capacities of colonized or formerly colonized peoples, anticommunists contended that U.S. colonialism in the Philippines and contemporary U.S. interventions demonstrated the United States' interests in liberating Asians from colonialism across the region.[77]

By 1957, George A. Malcolm argued that the racist language of the turn-of-the-century U.S. conquest of the Philippines was simply "a pitiful footnote" to a longer history in which "Americans [had] figured out how to develop liberal policies towards dependent peoples."[78] In this way, anticommunism was an element of a broader shift in U.S. imperial power and a constitutive piece in the ideology of U.S. imperial exceptionalism. Indeed, as the era of empires gave way to the era of decolonization, policymakers such as Malcolm transformed their studies of colonial management into stories of national development wherein "the United States had set a pattern in the Philippines of anti-colonialism leading to self-government for others to emulate."[79] Together, Americans and Filipinos collaborated to produce an anticommunist ideology that, in the era of decolonization, would fuse large-scale U.S.-driven projects, such as the promotion of capitalist development and the spread of U.S. military bases around the world.

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